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STATE HOME-INDUSTRY LEGISLATION AND FEDERAL
LAW: A LOOK AT FLORIDA'S ORANGE STABILIZATION ACT
As a result of either history, or geography, or both, the individual
economy of many states has become oriented toward a particular industry.
The fiscal welfare of the state may be dependent on the success of this in-
dustry for many reasons. The industry will frequently be responsible for the
employment of a substantial number of the state's citizens. If the industry is
booming, unemployment and welfare payments will be minimized. In addi-
tion, since the industry may affect interstate trade, its success will frequently
cause an influx of commerce to the state. Such an influx will result in in-
creased state tax revenue, so that the tax burden on all state citizens may be
lightened.
In those states where one industry constitutes a substantial source of state
wealth, legislation has often been passed to insure the continued success of the
industry. Sometimes the legislature will establish a state body composed of
persons directly engaged in growing or manufacturing the product to pro-
mote the industry by advertising, research, or educational programs.' More
often, however, the legislature provides for a state body which may regulate
the industry by establishing minimum prices to curtail destructive competi-
tion,2 limiting production to prevent the existence of a surplus,' or otherwise
eliminating wasteful practices. 4 Sometimes the regulatory body may be com-
posed of any state citizens,' but usually is made up primarily of growers or
manufacturers of the products involved. 6
• Although the interest of a state in its major industry is unquestionably
very great, the right of the state to regulate that industry is circumscribed by
the United States Constitution and federal law. Because nearly all important
state industries substantially affect interstate commerce, the commerce clause
will limit state regulatory power. Further, any state regulatory scheme under
which those engaged in the industry agree to mutual restraints may lead to a
1 See, e.g., N.D. Cent. Code §§ 4-28-01 to -09 (1959), which establishes a Wheat
Commission for the purpose of promoting North Dakota's wheat industry.
2 See, e.g., Me, Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 7, § 2954 (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1966),
under which the Maine Milk Commission is authorized to fix prices.
3 See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 7-3-6 (1963), allowing regulations by the Com-
missioner of Agriculture to prevent unnecessary waste of agricultural wealth because of
excessive shipments to market; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 71, § 1709-3 (1962), enabling the
Pennsylvania Department of Commerce to set up an Anthracite Producers Advisory
Board and Anthracite Committee, which in turn may set a production figure for the
coal industry.
4 See, e.g., Cal. Agric. Code § 1300.15(a) (West 1954), permitting Commission regu-
lations governing unfair trade practices in connection with the marketing of agricultural
products.
5 In Oklahoma, the gas and oil industries are regulated by the Corporation Com-
mission. Okla. Const. art. 9, § 18. The Commission is composed of three persons chosen
at a general statewide election. Okla. Const. art. 9, § 15.
6 See, e.g., Cal. Agric. Code § 2080 (West 1954) (agricultural products); Colo. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 7-3-7 (1963) (agricultural products) ; Idaho Code Ann. § 22-1002 (1947)
(agricultural products); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 7, § 2952 (1964) (milk).
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violation of the federal antitrust laws.? Finally, if the industry is of sub-
stantial importance to the nation as a whole, the federal government may
regulate it, bringing into question the validity of state regulation under the
supremacy clause.
The purpose of this note is to determine the extent of permissible state
regulation of a vital state industry in the light of the restrictions imposed by
the three areas of federal law mentioned above. This determination will be
made by analyzing a recent Florida statute, the Orange Stabilization Act
(hereinafter referred to as the OSA), which regulates the Florida orange in-
dustry.8 In addition to examining the Florida Act, Parker v. Brown,9 a lead-
ing case in the area of state agricultural regulation, will also be discussed.
Parker dealt with the impact of the antitrust laws, commerce clause, and
supremacy clause upon a marketing program under a statute similar to the
OSA, and constitutes the basis of current interpretation of the legal relation-
ship between state regulation such as the OSA and federal law.
I. THE ORANGE STABILIZATION ACT
The orange industry represents a great source of wealth to the state of
Florida, producing many millions of dollars each year." The industry is also
prominent nationally; about three-fourths of the nation's orange supply is
grown in Florida." The OSA was enacted for the purpose of maintaining an
orderly market for Florida orange products, so that economic benefit to
orange producers," consumers," and the State of Florida would be maxi-
mized." Under the OSA, the Florida Citrus Commission (Commission),
composed of twelve citrus fruit producers appointed every three years by the
Governor," may promulgate marketing orders to effect the purpose of the Act.
The marketing orders may be issued after notice of the proposed order by
7 See Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. FTC, 263 F.2d .502 (4th Cir. 1959).
8
 Ch. 67-220, 1967 Fla. Laws (Fla. Sess, Law Serv. 323 (1967)).
9 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
18
 In 1962, the total sale of Florida orange products was $231,031,000. National
Industrial Conference Board, The Economic Almanac 183 (17th ed. 1964).
I1 Florida produced 71%, 71%, and 79% of this country's orange products in 1964,
1965, and 1966 respectively. Fruit Situation, Feb. 1, 1967, at 2.
12 To enable producers . . . to correlate the supply of their oranges with market
demands ...
. . .	 .
To eliminate or reduce economic waste in the production, handling, and
marketing of oranges . . .
To restore and maintain adequate purchasing power for orange producers;
Ch. 67-220, §§ 1-601.154(1)(a), (d), (e), 1967 Fla. Laws (Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 323
(1967)).
13
 To stabilize the production and marketing of oranges . . . as .
	
it will
promote and protect the health, peace, safety, and general welfare of the people
of this state •	 .
Id. § I-601.154(1)(g).
14 To conserve the agricultural wealth of the state of Florida.
Id. § 1-601.154(1)(f).
15 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 601.04 (Supp. 1966), amending Fla. Stat. Ann. § 601.04 (1962).
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newspaper publication is given and a public hearing is held." In order to
become effective, however, a marketing order must also be approved in a
referendum by 65 percent of the producers who vote. In addition, those
producers who vote for the program must have delivered into the primary
channel of trade" at least 65 percent of the total number of oranges shipped
during a preceding representative shipping season. 18
The marketing orders may authorize the purchase of surplus oranges by
the Commission for abandonment, 19 impose quality standards for oranges, 2°
or establish a reserve pool of frozen concentrated orange juice.2 ' They may
not, however, fix prices in any manner. 22 A marketing order may fix assess-
ments on producers for the privilege of delivering oranges into the primary
channel of trade." The assessments are used to pay the expenses of the Com-
mission in creating and enforcing the marketing orders. 24 Violations of any
provision are punishable by criminal sanction" and the circuit courts of
Florida are given jurisdiction to enjoin such violations."
II. ANTITRUST LAWS
Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 27 a combination to fix prices," or
a combination whose necessary effect is to fix prices, 29 is illegal per se. Since
the OSA provides that orange producers, through the Commission, may formu-
late marketing orders to be adopted by other orange producers, the OSA
creates the machinery for combinations which may violate the Sherman Act."
In addition, a marketing order which establishes a reserve pool of concentrate
or which abandons surplus oranges must necessarily have the effect of setting
prices at a high level by decreasing the orange supply while not affecting the
market dernand. 3 ' Therefore, the requisites of a Sherman Act violation are
present in a marketing program under the OSA.
16
 Ch. 67-220, §§ 1-601.154(2), (3), 1967 Fla. Laws (Fla. Sess. Laws Serv. 323, 324
(1967)).
17
 Fruit shall be deemed to have been delivered into the primary channel of trade
when it is sold or delivered for shipment in fresh form, or when it is received
and accepted at a canning, concentrating, or processing plant . .
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 601.03(29) (1962).
18 Ch. 67-220, § 1-601.154(6), 1967 Fla. Laws (Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 323, 327 (1967)).
19
 Id. § 1-601.154(5) (b) (Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 326).
20 Provisions	 . fixing the minimum ratios of total soluble solids of the juice
of such oranges to the anhydrous citric acid thereof . . .
Id. § 1-601.154(5)(c).
21 Id .
 § 1-601.154(5)(d).
	 •
22 Id. § 2 (Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 331).
23
 Id. §§ 1-601.154(5)(e), (12) (Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 326, 328)
24 Id. § 1-601.154(14) (Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 324).
25 Id. § 1-601.154(16) (Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 330).
26 Id. § 1-601.154(17).
27
 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
28
 United States v. Trenton Potteries, Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
29
 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
Bo See Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959).
31
 See P. A. Samuelson, Economics 62-69 (5th ed. 1961).
The price at which any commodity will be sold is determined by the market forces
of supply and demand. Producers are willing to sell more of the commodity at a higher
price, and sell less at a lower price. Consumers are willing to buy less of the commodity
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It has been held, however, that there can be no violation of the Sherman
Act where federal or state governmental activity, rather than private action,
is involved," and this is supported by the legislative history of the Act. 33 In
Parker v. Brown," it was held that a program issued under the California
Agricultural Prorate Act (CAPA) 35 did not violate the Sherman Act. The
CAPA was very similar to the OSA. Upon application of ten producers to the
Agricultural Prorate Commission (APC) for the formulation of a marketing
program for a commodity, a public hearing is held. If the APC finds that some
program is necessary to prevent economic waste and that a program can be
drafted that will not permit the producers to obtain unreasonable profits,
the Director of Agriculture chooses a committee to draft the program. The
program becomes effective when approved by 65 percent of the producers
of that commodity who also own 51 percent of the land upon which the
product is grown.
The program in Parker classified raisins into three grades: inferior, sub-
standard, and standard. Under the program, inferior raisins could be used for
by-products only, while all of the substandard and a certain percentage of
the standard raisins were put in surplus and stabilization pools. The APC used
the pools to control the rate and volume of market flow. The effect of this
program, like the effect of a program under the OSA, was to decrease supply
without affecting demand and thus raise prices.
To determine the status of the program for purposes of the Sherman Act,
the Supreme Court looked to whether the statute merely authorized private
combinations or actually gave them effect as governmental action. Since the
APC, a state agency, adopted the program and enforced it with state sanc-
tions, the Court held that, as a matter of law, the promulgation of marketing
programs represented state action. The Court recognized that ultimately the
program could not become effective until it was approved by 65 percent of the
producers. It discounted this fact, however, on the basis that once the state
had exercised its administrative authority and promulgated a regulation, it
could impose any condition, including producer approval, as a condition
precedent to the effectiveness of the regulation.
The basic test used in Parker to determine whether combinations which
at a higher price, and buy more at a lower price. As a result of these supply and demand
forces, the price will settle at that point (called the equilibrium point) where the buyer
and seller are willing to buy and sell, respectively, the same quantity.
If marketing orders abandoning a surplus, establishing a reserve pool, or imposing
quality standards are issued under the OSA, the total orange supply will be substantially
decreased. When the total supply which producers may sell is substantially decreased, the
amount which producers will supply at any given price will be decreased. The effect of
this is to raise the price at which the equilibrium point will settle. The reason for this is
clear. The buyer will not buy the same quantity as before, because the price is too high;
neither will he buy a lesser quantity at the same price as before, because he is willing to
buy more at that price. Consequently, the new equilibrium point will be at a price higher,
and at a quantity lower, than previously. Therefore, as a result of the marketing order,
the new resultant of the market forces fixes prices at a higher level.
32 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir. 1966).
33
 21 Cong. Rec, 2457, 2459, 2461, 2562 (1889).
34 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
35 See Agriculture Producers Marketing Law, Cal. Agric. Code §§ 2000-2400 (West
1954) for the CAPA in its present form.
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are created under a state statute violate the antitrust laws has been applied in
other cases to reach the opposite result. In Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade
v. FTC,"° the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals was concerned with a North
Carolina statute which authorized local tobacco boards to make regulations
for the handling and sale of leaf tobacco at auction. Under the Parker test,
the court found that regulations issued by the local boards constituted private
action. Unlike Parker, the state did not pay expenses of the boards, or appoint
or run elections for board membership. Nor were the boards accountable to
or supervised by the state, except that the state required that the regulations
issued be just and reasonable. The boards were not obligated to comply with
a North Carolina statute requiring each state agency to file with the Secretary
of State all regulations issued.
The OSA contains provisions that are very similar to those found deter-
minative in Parker. The fact that the members of the Commission are ap-
pointed by the Governor, and must subscribe to the oath of office in the
Florida Constitution, leads to the conclusion that the Commission is a state
agency. As in Parker, this state agency adopts the marketing programs and
enforces them by penal sanctions. As a result, it seems clear that if Parker is
followed as precedent, programs pursuant to the OSA will not be struck down
for authorizing private action in violation of the antitrust laws.
The possibility that the OSA will be upheld on the authority of Parker
is disturbing. The antitrust laws were enacted not only for the benefit of the
competitors of price-fixers, but also for consumers at large. 38 The rationale of
Parker is that state action represents a balancing of all interests since the state
government is answerable to all voters within the state. Thus, a marketing
order would only be promulgated by the Commission after an objective
weighing of competitive impact on producers, consumers, and other affected
classes. When an important national industry is involved, however, this
rationale seems fundamentally defective. Consumers and producers outside the
state are not represented in the creation of marketing orders ; 39 yet, they will
be affected by the price impact of these orders. It cannot be assumed, for
example, that a Florida administrative agency will give due consideration to
these out-of-state interests, especially if they may conflict with the interests
of Florida producers and consumers. In addition, the Parker rationale is little
more than a fiction when applied to the process of creating marketing orders
under the OSA. Flordia consumers are directly affected by higher orange
prices. As a practical matter, however, since marketing orders are created
exclusively by producers, the consumer has no representation. While it is true
that Florida consumers have an interest in maintaining a stable orange in-
dustry, since the industry does have such an effect on the general economy of
the state, they do not want unnecessarily high prices. Without representation,
the consumers have no assurance that the producers will not use marketing
orders to obtain excessive profits.
' 19 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959).
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 106-465 (1960),
39 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 409 (1911).
39 See Note, The Anthracite Coal Production Control Plan, 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 368,
388 (1954).
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The result of exempting marketing programs like those under the OSA
from the antitrust laws is to permit the imposition of trade restraints on per-
sons who have no ability to protect their interests, a result which seems to
directly contravene the federal antitrust policy. It is submitted, therefore, that
the rationale of Parker should be re-examined on this issue to avoid this
anomalous result.
III. REGULATION OF COMMERCE
By virtue of its sovereignty, a state has the power to regulate its
internal commerce. 4° This power, however, is subject to the pervasive power
of Congress over interstate commerce under the commerce clause. The degree
to which state power is limited by this clause has traditionally been deter-
mined by the "mechanical" or "direct burden" test. Under this test a determi-
nation is made whether the effect of the state regulation is to place a direct
burden on interstate commerce by regulating an aspect of that commerce.'"
If a direct burden is found, the regulation is beyond the state power, and is
void.
Applying this standard, the Court in Parker held that regulation of a
product in its unprocessed state, before preparation for market, is not a
regulation of interstate commerce even though it may have the effect of
reducing the volume of interstate commerce with respect to that product.
The Court distinguished the cases of Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co.42 and
Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co." in which regulations of intrastate shipping
were struck down because the intrastate activity was not for the purpose of
resale or processing, but was only incidental to an interstate transaction. In
Lemke and Shafer, operators of grain elevators in North Dakota attempted to
enjoin the enforcement of state statutes regulating the grading, weighing,
inspecting, and pricing of wheat purchased by the operators from local pro-
ducers. In both cases, the operators were successful in obtaining an injunction
upon a showing that only about 10 percent of the wheat grown in North Da-
kota was consumed locally, the remainder being sold primarily to local ele-
vator operators who shipped and sold the grain interstate.
Under the OSA, marketing orders may be applied to any oranges shipped
directly into the primary channel of trade. This definition would include not
only oranges shipped to consumers or processors in Florida, but also oranges
shipped from a processor or producer to out-of-state destinations. It is clear
that the latter transactions are purely interstate, within the meaning of
Lemke and Shafer, and therefore are not subject to state regulation. As a
result, a marketing order could be effective only if applied to oranges before
processing, or to oranges destined exclusively for intrastate use.
The mechanical test has been criticized,'" however, and recently has
4° Ware & Leland v. Mobile County, 209 U.S. 405 (1908).
41 Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1, 8 (1933).
42 258 U.S. 50 (1922).
43 268 U.S. 189 (1925).
44 In this case the traditional test of the limit of state action by inquiring
whether the interference with Commerce is indirect or direct seems to me too
mechanical, too uncertain in its application, and too remote from actualities,
to be of value. In thus making use of the expressions "direct" and "indirect
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been subordinated, with slight exception," to the "balancing-of-interests"
test." Under the balancing test, a state regulation is valid only if the local
interest in the subject to be regulated outweighs the national interest. 47
In Parker, the Court applied the balancing test and found the CAPA valid.
After examining the history of the California raisin industry and the com-
bined efforts of both federal and state governments to stabilize the raisin
prices, the Court found that the state had a very great interest in the raisin
industry.
This history shows clearly enough that the adoption of legislative
measures to prevent the demoralization of the industry by stabilizing
the marketing of the raisin crop is a matter of state as well as
national concern and, in the absence of inconsistent Congressional
action, is a problem whose solution is peculiarly within the province
of the state."
In assessing the federal interest and its importance in comparison to the state
interest, the Court put particular emphasis on the fact that Congress had
attempted to remedy marketing conditions of other agricultural products by
federal programs similar to the CAPA.
It thus appears that whatever effect the operation of the Cali-
fornia program may have on interstate commerce, it is one which it
has been the policy of Congress to aid and encourage through federal
agencies . . . . Hence we cannot say that the effect of the state pro-
gram on interstate commerce is one which conflicts with Congres-
sional policy or is such as to preclude the state from this exercise of
its reserved power to regulate domestic agricultural production.'"
Traditionally in commerce clause questions the Court has balanced the
state interest against a federal interest in uniformity of regulation. 5° Although
the Court did not expressly so state, it can be inferred that the Court was
looking for evidence of an interest in uniformity in Parker. Instead, however,
the Court found evidence, in the encouragement of Congress, that there was
no need for uniformity of regulation. Thus, the Court concluded that the
national interest in the regulation of the raisin industry was less than that
of the state in which the industry is concentrated, and upheld the CAPA
program.
In deciding that the state interest in raisin regulation prevailed over the
federal interest, however, the Court overlooked the federal interest in main-
taining a commerce free from unreasonable restraints of trade. This interest
is clearly expressed by the antitrust laws. Although state activity may enjoy
interference" with Commerce, we are doing little more than using labels to
describe a result rather than any trustworthy formula by which it is reached.
Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44 (1927) (Dissenting opinion by Justice Stone).
45 See Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
46 Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S.
714 (1963); United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 548 (1944).
47 Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 768-69 (1945).
48 317 U.S, at 367.
40 Id. at 368.
5° Southern Pac, Co, v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. at 767.
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immunity from those laws, this does not mean that the policy embodied
within them should not be considered under the commerce clause.
There is, however, one possible reason why the Parker Court did not
consider the federal antitrust policy even though the raisin program restrained
trade. The Federal Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act,m which provides
for programs similar to the California program for other commodities, grants
a specific exemption from the antitrust laws to marketing agreements promul-
gated under it.52 Because the federal government had clearly renounced its
antitrust policy in this field of regulation, the Court may have felt that there
is no reason why that policy should be a bar to the state.
This argument is deficient, however, since it ignores the fact that the
federal government may protect consumers and producers of all states from
harmful trade restraints, and presumably considers the effects of potential
restraints in formulating and administering its marketing regulations. A state,
however, cannot be expected to fully protect the out-of-state consumer or
producer from trade restraints except to the extent that it fears such restraints
may decrease the market demand for its locally produced goods. Conse-
quently, although the federal government furnishes machinery for establishing
trade restraints, this fact is not grounds for excluding antitrust policy from
the factors weighed in determining the ability of the state to regulate under
the commerce clause.
As a result, it appears that the Court in Parker did not give the national
interest in the regulation of the raisin industry the full weight it deserved.
Although the particular local interest in the case may have been very per-
suasive, whether or not this interest outweighed the federal policy against
restraints of trade is not so clear that the Court should have totally ignored
the issue.
Because of the Court's incomplete analysis, the Parker decision should
not provide a complete answer to the status of the OSA. Even if Parker were
followed, however, there are certain factual distinctions which may Iead to
a different result. It is true that the problems to be solved under the OSA
are within the ambit of state concern, and that Florida, like California, is in
a particularly apt position to protect its industry from surpluses and meteoro-
logical catastrophes, in spite of the national repercussions these problems
may have. 53 In fact, Florida may have a greater interest in its oranges than
California in its raisins L 4 On the other hand, the national importance of the
Florida orange industry in 1967 is greater than that of the California raisin
industry in 1943. 55 More important, there is no evidence that the regulation
61 48 Stat. 31 (1933), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-24 (1964), as amended, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 602, 608c, 608f, 612c-1 (Supp. II, 1967).
52
 7 U.S.C. § 608b (1964).
56 In Parker, close to 90% of the nation's raisins were produced in California.
317 U.S. at 345. Florida produces a slightly lower percentage of the nation's oranges.
See note 11 supra.
64 In 1962, the total sale of Florida orange products was $231,031,000, which was
27.6% of the state's gross agricultural product. National Industrial Conference Board,
The Economic Almanac 183 (17th ed. 1964). The exact dollar figure for California
raisins is uncertain, but it is almost certainly less than the orange total.
55
 In 1953, California produced nearly 229,000 tons of raisins. 23 Encyclopedia
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of the orange industry need not be uniform," and a finding on this issue
appears to have been decisive in Parker.
On balance, it is unclear whether the importance of the orange industry
to Florida and the fact that Florida has a special knowledge of the industry's
problems outweighs the national interest in the industry, including antitrust
policy and the need (if any) for uniformity of regulation. Because neither
the state nor national interest in the orange industry is perceptibly preponder-
ant, it is uncertain whether the OSA can withstand a commerce clause attack.
It is certain, however, that if such an attack occurs, Parker should be re-
examined because of its limited analysis of the factors tending to exclude
state regulation.
IV. PRIVILEGE TAX
As a general principle, a state may impose a tax on the privilege of doing
intrastate business, and within reasonable limits, may apply the tax rate to a
fair proportion of the taxpayer's business done within the state, if he does
both interstate and intrastate business." A state may not, however, base a
tax on the privilege of carrying on a business which is solely interstate in
character," since the power to regulate, and therefore tax, interstate com-
merce resides solely in Congress under the commerce clause. Likewise, a state
may not tax an intrastate transaction if that transaction is incidental to an
interstate transaction." The test must necessarily lie in the transaction itself,
the problem being to determine whether it is primarily interstate or intrastate
in nature.
The OSA provides for an assessment on every producer" for the privilege
of delivering oranges into the primary channel of trade. Fruit which is "sold
or delivered for shipment in fresh form" is included in the definition of
primary channel of trade.61 Since some orange producers may sell or deliver
exclusively for shipment interstate, with respect to these producers the state
tax cannot be validly imposed since it will be a tax on the privilege of carry-
ing on an exclusively interstate business. These producers will be exempt from
the tax even if they ship the fresh oranges intrastate first, provided that the
intrastate delivery is merely incidental to an essentially interstate transaction.
If, however, the intrastate shipment is for more than an incidental purpose,
such as canning, concentrating or processing, then the producer may be taxed
Americana 194 (1958). It is doubtful that this figure was higher ten years earlier. In 1966,
Florida produced 6,408,000 tons of oranges. Fruit Situation, Feb. 1, 1967, at 2.
55 In Parker, the Court pointed to congressional and administrative approval of the
state program as evidence that national uniformity was not necessary. No such federal
approval exists with regard to the OSA. Letter from George L. Mehrcn, Assistant Secre-
tary, Department of Agriculture, Sept. 1, 1967.
57 International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416 (1947).
58 Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
59 Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157 (1954).
GO Ch. 67-220, § 1-601.154(12), 1967 FIa. Laws (Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 323, 328
(1967)).
61 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 601.03(29) (1962).
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even though the oranges are to be transported out of the state soon after
delivery. 62
V. SUPREMACY CLAUSE
The supremacy clause dictates that all laws made pursuant to the United
States Constitution shall be binding upon the states, any state law to the
contrary notwithstanding. With this clause as a starting point, the courts
have developed the doctrine of preemption. Under this doctrine, if federal
law and state law occupy the same field, and there is a clear intent manifested
in the congressional act that the federal regulation is to be exclusive, then
the state is precluded from regulation in that field." Usually, the intent to
exclude state regulation must be expressed in the federal act." The requisite
congressional intent may also be inferred, however, if it is found that the
scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive that there is no room for supple-
mentary state action, 65
 or if it is found that national interest in the area is
predominant." Any determination of the validity of Florida's regulation of
the orange industry, then, must take into account the potential preemptive
effect of congressional regulation of agriculture.
The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act (AMAA) 67 is the major
congressional act in the field of agricultural regulation. The AMAA does not
in its own terms attempt to regulate the marketing of any agricultural com-
modity. Instead, it first sets forth a broad policy, and then grants power to
the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate marketing orders in accordance
with the policy. Through these orders, the Secretary may control the quantity
of a commodity which may be marketed in interstate commerce in four
ways:" (I) by allotting the amount which each handler may purchase from
producers or ship interstate to outlets; (2) by disposing of a surplus; (3) by
establishing a reserve pool for any commodity; and (4) by maintaining
inspection requirements. Because of the nature of this scheme, the impact
of the AMAA on state regulation will be considered on two levels. First, do
the policies set out in the Act evidence an intent to exclude state regulation?
Second, do the orders issued by the Secretary pursuant to the Act create
conflicts with state regulation which will have the necessary effect of pre-
empting state action?
The major policies of the AMAA are explicitly delineated in the Act:
62
 See International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340 (1944);
Department of Treasury v. Wood Preserving Corp., 313 U.S. 62 (1941). Since Florida
may not tax producers who are engaged exclusively in interstate commerce, some potential
revenue will be lost. This loss should be relatively slight, however, since the bulk of the
industry is made up of oranges sent intrastate for processing or other change of form,
and these oranges are subject to the tax.
63
 See Rice v. Board of Trade, 331 U.S. 247 (1947).
64 Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598, 614 (1940); Gilvary v. Cuyahoga Valley Ry.,
292 U.S. 57, 60 (1934).
05 Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942).
66
 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 US. 52 (1941).
07 48 Stat. 31 (1933), as amended, 7 U.S.C. 11 601-24 (1964), as amended, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 602, 608c, 608f, 612c-1 (Supp. II, 1967).
68 7 US.C. § 608(c)(6) (1964).
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[T]o establish and maintain such orderly marketing conditions
for agricultural commodities in interstate commerce as will establish,
as the prices to farmers, parity prices . . . .
To protect the interest of the consumer by . . . authorizing no
action . . . which has for its purpose the maintenance of prices to
farmers above the level of the parity price ...
[T]o establish and maintain such minimum standards of qual-
ity and maturity . . . as will be in the public interest . . . .
[T]o establish and maintain such orderly marketing conditions
. . . as will provide, in the interests of producers and consumers, an
orderly flow of the supply . . . to avoid unreasonable fluctuations in
supplies and prices."
These stated policies contain no express manifestation of an intent to exclude
state agricultural regulation. Yet, if these policies alone were determinative,
it might be possible to infer preemptive intent from the pervasiveness of the
policies and the manifest national interest. The Court in Parker, however,
noted the existence of another section of the AMAA that negates such an
inference.
Under Section 10(i) 7° of the AMAA, the Secretary of Agriculture is
authorized "in order to effectuate the declared policy" of the Act, and "in
order to obtain uniformity in the formulation, administration, and enforce-
ment of federal and state programs relating to the regulation of the handling
of agricultural commodities," to confer and cooperate with duly constituted
authorities of any state. The Court found in this section a policy encouraging
state action complementary to action under the AMAA. Thus, the Court
found an express intent not to preempt, but instead to encourage, state regula-
tion to the extent that the state action is complementary. As a result, the
Court held that California could regulate the raisin industry; the logic of
this holding would also allow Florida to regulate the orange industry.
The Court noted, however, that it is not enough that the general policy
of the federal act is to encourage complementary state regulation. It is
possible that there are specific policies, stated in the AMAA, which will
conflict in whole or in part with the state regulatory scheme within the area
the stated federal policy covers. In Parker, the Court noted a possibility of
conflict between the federal parity policy and the marketing orders issued
under the CAPA. Although parity is defined at length in the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1938, 71 and this definition is used under the AMAA, it is
sufficient for purposes of this note to define parity as giving to agricultural
commodities a purchasing power with reference to articles that farmers buy,
equivalent to the purchasing power of agricultural commodities in a certain
period determined by the Secretary of Agriculture. Because the CAPA made
no mention of a limitation on prices based on parity, it was logically possible
that the raisin program issued under the CAPA might be used to drive raisin
prices above parity.
69 7 U.S.C. § 602 (1964).
79
 7 U.S.C. § 610(i) (1964).
71 7 U.S.C. § 1301(a) (1) (1964).
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Without comparing the two policies, the Court found no conflict between
the raisin program and the federal parity policy, relying on evidence of
federal acquiescence to the state program. This acquiescence was inferred
from the fact that the Department of Agriculture had collaborated in the
preparation of the raisin program and helped finance the program through
one of its agencies. 72 The Court found this approval to be convincing evidence
that the state program would not drive prices above parity and thus would
not conflict with the AMAA policy. The persuasive force of this evidence is
revealed by the limitation the Court placed on its holding.
We have no occasion to decide whether the same conclusion
would follow if the state program had not been adopted with the
collaboration of the officials of the Department of Agriculture and
aided by loans from the Commodity Credit Corporation recom-
mended by the Secretary of Agriculture."
The OSA policies are nearly identical to those of the CAPA. 74 Like the
CAPA policies, the OSA policies of maximizing gain to producers, consumers,
and the state do not conflict with the AMAA policies to establish minimum
standards in the public interest or prevent unreasonable fluctuations in price
• and market flow. The only AMAA policy which might conflict with the OSA
is the parity price policy. For two reasons, however, the issue of OSA validity
with regard to parity may not be determined solely on the basis of Parker.
First, Parker treated the validity of market programs issued under a regulatory
statute, while the question under the OSA is the validity of a regulatory
statute where no marketing orders have been issued under it. Second, there
has been no federal approval of the OSA or any program under it. 75
The holding in Parker, that the program was unobjectionable on suprem-
acy clause grounds implies, that the CAPA itself is valid. Beyond this, how-
ever, there is an additional basis for upholding the CAPA, and, by analogy,
the OSA. The absence of a parity provision in the CAPA allowed only for
a possible conflict between a marketing order and the AMAA. That is, al-
though a marketing order may be created under the CAPA which conflicts
with the federal parity policy, marketing orders may be created that do not
conflict. Under the supremacy clause, however, the Court has held that an
actual conflict must be present before the state regulation falls." On this
basis alone, the AMAA parity policy is not a bar to the OSA. Although the
OSA policies of improving the economic condition of Florida producers and
consumers could lead to marketing orders that result in price rises above
parity, such a conflict is not a necessary result. Since it has been established
that the AMAA is not in itself a bar to the OSA under the supremary clause,
it is necessary to proceed to the next level of federal agricultural regulation—
the Secretary of Agriculture's program.
The Secretary's program provides for a Growers Administrative Corn-
72 317 Us. at 358.
73 Id, at 358-59.
74 See p. 122 supra.
75 Letter from George L. Mehren, supra note 56.
76 Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963).
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mittee composed of eight or nine producers selected by the Secretary after
yearly nominations by the producers, 77 and a Shippers Advisory Committee
composed of eight handlers selected by the Secretary after yearly nominations
by the handlers." All members may be discharged by the Secretary at any
time, and any act of a committee may be voided by the Secretary." Market-
ing orders are formulated by the Secretary in three stages. First, before sug-
gesting any orders for any fruit, the committees submit to the Secretary a
detailed report setting forth an advisable marketing policy." Second, the
committees submit proposed orders to the Secretary. These orders may limit
the shipment of fresh fruit by enforcing quality and maturity standards, 81
by prescribing the type of shipping container to be used, 82 or by prohibiting
any shipment." Third, if the Secretary finds that the purposes of the AMAA
will be effectuated by any order, he may issue that order.84 Revenue to
finance the creation of marketing regulations is obtained by taxing each
handler in proportion to his share of the total fruit shipped."
Before examining the relationship between the Secretary's program and
the OSA, it is necessary to determine the status of the Secretary's program
for purposes of the supremacy clause. If state action is complementary to the
Secretary's program, there can be no supremacy clause problem. A problem
may arise, however, if state action conflicts with the Secretary's program,
for the logical inference is that Congress intended that the conflicting state
regulation be ineffective. Otherwise, the state could defeat the AMAA pur-
pose of having federal regulation of agricultural commodities. Therefore, for
purposes of the supremacy clause, the Secretary's program under the AMAA
should have the same force as congressional action. 86 As a result, the OSA
will be valid only to the extent that it does not conflict with the Secretary's
program.
When the Secretary's program and the OSA are compared, one fact
immediately stands out. Federal marketing orders may apply to nonprocessed
fruit, whereas marketing orders under the OSA may regulate both processed
and nonprocessed fruit. This fact eliminates any consideration of Florida
marketing orders relating to processed orange products from the conflict
issue. The focus, then, must turn to fresh orange marketing orders under the
OSA.
There are two types of marketing orders available to the Commission
to regulate fresh orange production. The Commission may purchase and
abandon a surplus, and impose quality and maturity standards. The policy
behind authorizing purchase and abandonment orders under the OSA is to
77 7 C.F.R. § 905.21 (1967).
78 7 C.F.R. § 905.24 (1967).
79 7 C.F.R. § 905.35 (1967).
80 7 C.F.R. § 905.50(a) (1967).
81 7 C.F.R. § 905.52 (a) (2) (1967) This limitation may be "only in terms of grades
and sizes."
82 7 C.F.R. § 905.52(a)(5) (1967).
83 7 C.F.R. § 905.52(a)(3) (1967).
84 7 C.F.R. § 905.52(a) (1967).
85 7 C.F.R. § 905.41 (1967).
86 Sec Public Util. Comm'n v. United States, 333 U.S. 534 (1958).
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prevent the decline of orange prices caused by destructive competition. This
policy is nearly identical to the Secretary's policy underlying the authoriza-
tion of marketing orders to limit the quantity of oranges shipped. It is true
that action under these policies could conflict; for example, the Florida
Citrus Commission may pass a marketing order authorizing a purchase of
surplus so that the total shipment of oranges would be limited, when the
Secretary did not want any shipment limitations. It is also possible, however,
that purchase of surplus would not result in any practical limitation on
shipment or that limitation of shipment would not be contrary to the
Secretary's policy. Therefore, a situation of possible conflict is present. As
discussed above, such a possibility of conflict cannot void the OSA provisions.
The supremacy clause would only be a bar to an OSA marketing order that
came in actual conflict with the Secretary's program. Hence, the provision
allowing the purchase and abandonment of a surplus can withstand a suprem-
acy clause attack.
The OSA provision empowering the Commission to measure maturity by
a chemical test87 poses a more difficult problem. The relationship between this
provision and the Secretary's program is unclear. The OSA calls for maturity
standards based on the ratio of soluble solids in the juice to anhydrous citric
acid. The Secretary's policy regarding quality standards is set forth in his
program. He may: "[Li imit the shipment of any variety by establishing
and maintaining, only in terms of grades and sizes, or both, minimum stan-
dards of quality and maturity."88
The precise meaning of the phrase "minimum standards" in this policy
has recently been litigated. In Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul," the Supreme Court interpreted this policy in the Secretary's avocado
program merely to set minimum quality standards, which could be imple-
mented by more stringent state requirements. As a result, the Court upheld a
state eight percent oil-content requirement in spite of the fact that six out of
every hundred avocados approved by the federal government under its pro-
gram were excluded by the California Act.
The interpretation of the federal maturity standard in Avocado is subject
to criticism. While the majority decided that the minimum standards de-
manded only that a state not impose a less stringent requirement, four dis-
senters, Justices White, Black, Clark and Douglas felt that a state could
not even require a higher standard, because the Secretary's maturity policy
called for uniform treatment of avocados based on size and weight. In reach-
ing this conclusion, the dissenters stressed the fact that the Secretary had
expressly rejected chemical tests and that state chemical tests seriously
undermined the ability of the Secretary to enforce his standard. It is sub-
mitted that the federal interest in maturity standards is basically one of
uniformity of regulation, that the federal standards are more than mere
minimum standards, and that the dissent's reading of the federal policy
was proper.
87 Ch. 67-220, § 1-601.154(5)(c), 1967 Fla. Laws (Fla. Sess. Law Seri/. 323, 327
(1967) ).
88 7 C.F.R. § 905.52(a)(2) (1967).
89 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
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If the dissent's reading of the federal maturity policy is accepted, there
is serious question as to the validity of the OSA policy of determining maturity
of the basis of a chemical test. Assuming that there is no relation between
the ratio of soluble solids to anhydrous citric acid and the size and grade of
fruit, it is very possible that the chemical test of the OSA will treat oranges
of the same size and shape differently. For example, assume that the Secretary
issues an order excluding from market all oranges less than three inches in
diameter, and the Commission promulgates a marketing order imposing its
chemical test as a quality standard for all Florida oranges.
There would be three possible results of these agencies regulating matur-
ity in this manner. First, the Commission's standards might at all times be
stricter than those of the Department of Agriculture. In this case, the state
regulation would be valid as to all oranges less than three inches in diameter,
but as to larger oranges the OSA standards would conflict with those of the
Secretary. If, however, uniformity is not a basic part of the federal policy,
then the federal standard would only be setting a minimum, and a stricter
state standard would not conflict. Second, the Commission's standards might
at all times be more lenient than those of the Department of Agriculture. In
this case, the state minimum standard would conflict directly with the
Secretary's minimum and could not stand. Third, the Commission's standards
may sometimes be more lenient and other times stricter than the Secre-
tary's standards. The state regulation in this case must also be invalid because
it is an attempt to treat oranges of three inches in diameter differently when
the federal policy of uniformity demands that oranges of the same size and
grade be treated equally.
As a practical matter, if the assumption that there is no direct relation
between size and grade and the ratio of soluble solids to anhydrous citric
acid is valid, the third possible situation will occur. Since it is possible that
the Commission's standards will always be more strict than the Secretary's,
only a possibility of conflict is present and the supremacy clause would not
be a bar to the existence of the state maturity policy. It may be, however,
that the marketing orders available within this narrow category are not
realistic maturity standards and, thus, the practical result is that the pos-
sibility of conflict excludes all reasonable regulation using chemical standards.
Although the majority holding in Avocado appears to allow the Florida
Citrus Commission to impose a chemical maturity test, there is some evidence
that the Commission has realized that this may impair federal-state rela-
tions. The Commission has chosen to adopt the federal quality standards and
to enforce those standards as state law."
Even though Congress has exercised its perogative to regulate the orange
industry, the applicable federal legislation indicates a clear purpose that state
regulation of the industry be maintained. It is true that the Secretary's
regulations pursuant to the congressional action place certain limitations on
Florida's freedom to regulate. Nevertheless, neither the federal law nor
regulations circumscribe Florida's regulatory power to the extent that the
state does not have broad authority over its orange industry.
00 Letter from George L. Mehren, supra note 56.
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VI. CONCLUSION
From the above analysis of the OSA, some general conclusions may be
drawn as to the restrictive effects of the antitrust laws, commerce clause, and
supremacy clause on the power of a state to regulate a local industry.
Although the present state of antitrust law allows a state to regulate a
local industry through a state agency composed of persons directly engaged
in the industry, the fact that many interested parties are not fairly represented
in such a regulatory system could lead to a reconsideration and alteration of
this area of the law. At the moment, the method of market control employed
by the OSA enjoys immunity from the antitrust laws. In view of the strong
arguments against regulation without representation, however, it is conceiv-
able that either Congress or the courts will broaden the scope of antitrust
law to prohibit this particular form of state regulation.
The commerce clause, unlike the antitrust laws, presents an imminent
threat to a state's ability to regulate a major industry. Because the validity
under the commerce clause of state regulation of a local industry having
interstate ramifications is currently determined under the "balancing-of-
interests" test, however, it would be futile to attempt to formulate a general
rule stating the extent to which this clause circumscribes state power. By
virtue of the balancing technique, each market control mechanism must be
examined according to the particular federal and state interests involved.
Because the states are becoming increasingly interdependent, with more and
more products being drawn into interstate trade, and because a substantial
state industry will usually have national importance, the commerce clause
must always be regarded as a major threat to state regulation of a substantial
local industry.
The supremacy clause has a far less restrictive effect than the commerce
clause on the ability of a state to regulate an important local industry. Un-
like the commerce clause, the supremacy clause does not even come into play
until Congress has acted with respect to the particular industry involved.
Even where Congress has so acted, it is improbable that federal regulation
will be so far-reaching that there does not remain extensive regulatory power
in the state, unless the need for uniformity of regulation is disproportionately
large. The relationship of the AMAA to the OSA indicates that action by the
federal government will generally provide ample room for complementary
state action.
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